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Reliable High-Speed Networked Computing
R.K.Iyer, Z.Kalbarczyk, S.Bagchi 
Abstract
This paper presents Chameleon, an adaptive infrastructure which allows different levels of availability 
requirements to be simultaneously supported in a single clustered environment. Fundamental 
components which constitute Chameleon are: (1) Fault Tolerance Manager (FTM) acting as an 
independent and intelligent entity capable of identifying and establishing the required fault tolerance 
strategy for executing the user application, (2) Reliable, Mobile and Intelligent Agents capable of 
migrating through the network and operating autonomously on behalf of the FTM according to built- 
in specifications and instructions, (3) Surrogate Manager operating as a pseudo-manager and capable 
of interacting with the user and supporting proper communications with the agents which monitor the 
application execution on remote hosts, (4) Host Daemons residing on each host and responsible for 
handshaking with the agents and monitoring the agents behavior, and (5) Software Libraries providing 
basic building blocks to create or re-engineer agents. A prototype implementation of Chameleon on a 
small LAN of heterogeneous machines connected to the high-speed Myrinet switch, is described.
Keywords: adaptive fault-tolerance, highly available networked computing, error detection and 
recovery.
1 Introduction
In contemporary networked computing systems, a broad range of commercial and scientific 
applications which need varying degrees of availability must coexist. It is not cost effective to 
develop a reliable platform in each case. It is more efficient to build an infrastructure which 
provides the required levels of dependability based on application needs. It is also essential that 
the proposed alternatives be cost-effective. Hence, a primary issue to be addressed is how the 
envisioned infrastructure can leverage off-the-shelf components. There have been exhaustive 
studies on fault tolerance strategies (hardware and/or software implemented) capable of providing
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efficient mechanisms to deal with system operational failures. Most of these works however 
focused on specific application needs and thus provided piecemeal solutions. Little work has been 
done in addressing how to build reliable networked computing system out of unreliable 
computation nodes. As a result there is no comprehensive solution for providing a wide range of 
fault-tolerant services in a single networked environment. The most feasible way of understanding 
how such a software environment would fit on top of existing layers (like the operating system, 
the network interfaces, etc.) is to implement the infrastructure for providing a range of reliable 
services. So it has been attempted to integrate a wide variety of existing strategies into a single 
environment on top of the hardware and software of heterogeneous workstations on a LAN. A 
prototype implementation of the envisioned approach is expected to provide useful insights into 
its feasibility.
This paper introduces and describes Chameleon, a software infrastructure capable of providing 
configurable (i.e., according to user specification) levels of fault tolerance in a networked 
computing environment. Methods and techniques supported by Chameleon are embodied in a set 
of specialized, reliable and intelligent Agents supported by a Fault Tolerance Manager (FTM) and 
its Surrogates to ensure that applications execute with the required levels of reliability. The 
components have been so designed that none of them is a single point of failure. Each of the 
components is active for a certain period e.g., during setting up the system configuration. In the 
case of a component failure during its active phase there is a provision for recovery, either by 
switching to backup or by regenerating the component. The broad goals of Chameleon are stated 
below:
• Dynamic handling of changing failure criticality requirements: certain segments of the 
application may be deemed more critical than others. The FTM is capable of recognizing such 
demarcations and executing different segments using different configurations tuned to provide 
required reliability levels.
• Adaptability to user-directed availability levels: the FTM, through the Agents and the available 
libraries of fault detection and recovery mechanisms, determines the user availability 
requirements and executes the application in the user-directed mode. Thus, unlike most
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existing implementations, it can adapt to user availability requirements with just the amount of 
overhead required for supporting the particular level.
• Rapid error detection and recovery: Chameleon supports failure detection at three different 
levels:
Application or process monitoring. The application executing at a remote host is 
monitored locally by the agents residing at the remote host. A misbehaving application 
raises an offending signal which is captured by the corresponding agent. Thus the 
detection is not tied up with the FTM.
Agent monitoring. The agents are also monitored locally, by the Host Daemons residing 
on every host. The monitoring is through exceptions as well as i_am_alive messages.
Node monitoring. Whether a particular computation node is up or down is monitored by 
the FTM through periodic heartbeat messages. The heartbeat scheme could be extended to 
include nodes sending out signatures containing information about the status of the 
various components, which would then be tallied at the FTM.
• Providing reliability with unreliable hardware and software components : Chameleon does not 
pre-suppose any special reliable platforms for execution or any specialized software. The 
computation nodes are mainly regular workstations or personal computers. All nodes are 
expected to have pre-installed C++ compiler and interpreter for a scripting language such as 
TCL. The Fault Tolerance Manager needs to run with a high degree of reliability (e.g., in a 
primary/backup mode). This would make the cost of maintaining the FTM high, but it would 
be distributed among all the end-users. This approach seems to be much cheaper and more 
efficient than to provide a separate fault-tolerant machine to individual user. The point to be 
stressed is that Chameleon uses components off the shelf. Thus there is no specialized 
hardware requirements for the user machines, nor any thick pre-installed software layer. This 
makes for cost effective services.
• Scaleable services : Chameleon provides a unified framework for allowing the system to scale 
in two major dimensions:
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Physical scalability - the system structure is based on a high-speed network such as 
Myrinet or ServerNet. In this environment adding new computation nodes will improve 
the system performance (because of high bandwidth of the underlying network) while 
communication overheads will grow slowly with system size.
Fault tolerance scalability - Chameleon provides a general procedure for creating agents 
and extending functions of already existing agents. The FTM utilizes this procedure to 
generate agents for supporting the application dependent fault tolerance strategy. To 
support this approach, two basic libraries are provided: (1) library o f building blocks and 
(2) library o f agents. The building blocks are used in agent creation. The user is also 
allowed to develop his own basic building blocks which can be incorporated in an agent 
created by FTM.
2 Related Research
There are examples of highly fault-tolerant, distributed systems which have demonstrated that 
there are efficient solutions for providing highly reliable computations. For example, Tandem 
architecture groups servers (processing nodes) into failure masking server pair group, in Stratus 
architecture all components (e.g., CPU, I/O, communication controller) are implemented by 
paired microprocessors that execute identical instmction streams and continuously compare the 
results. These are, however, dedicated fault-tolerant architectures oriented to specific applications 
and offering static level of fault tolerance. In the common networked systems, the computation 
nodes are usually not fault-tolerant machines or have very little to support highly reliable services. 
The question to be asked is how to achieve high reliability with unreliable components?
To be cost effective and operationally efficient, a promising solution is to use a specialized 
software layer for organizing the system components into a reliable computation environment. By 
adding a dedicated software layer capable of providing predictable, fault-tolerant behavior, 
reliability of the overall system can be significantly improved. Current approaches to reliable 
distributed computing are mainly based on exploiting distributed groups of cooperating processes. 
There is a number of studies that address various aspects of this paradigm e.g., process 
synchronization, jobs distribution, fault tolerance strategies, e.g., [1], [3]. These studies result in a
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number of tools to support the construction of reliable services, e.g., Isis [2], Totem [5], Delta-4 
[7], Horns [8].
Most of these approaches require specialized and complex software layer which must be installed 
in each computation node. For example, they heavily rely on underlying protocols for supporting 
group membership and atomic broadcast. As a primary objective of developing these systems is to 
provide a software environment for constructing distributed applications, the service availability 
issue is not often of a primary concern. Consequently, there is no dedicated mechanism for error 
detection and the fault tolerance is somewhat of “a side effect” of the use of the group 
communication approach. The system usually relies on the error detection based on capturing the 
time-out in a response from one of the processes in the group. When the time-out is encountered, 
the group must reach a consensus as to which process failed and should be excluded from the 
group. Then, the process next in the hierarchy takes over.
Recently, the Piranha system presented in [4] is an attempt to address the issue of service 
availability in the execution of a distributed application. Piranha is a CORBA-based tool for 
attaining high availability in distributed systems. CORBA, a Common Object Request Broker 
Architecture is widely used distributed standard which provides interoperability between 
applications on different machines in heterogeneous distributed environments and interconnects 
multiple object systems [6]. CORBA does not address issues of availability and reliability and 
cannot consistently detect partial failures in distributed applications. Piranha exploits the dynamic 
replication of objects for achieving high availability. However, the necessary software layer is 
thick as Piranha runs on Electra, a CORBA Object Request Broker supporting the object group 
abstraction, reliable multicast, state transfer, and virtual synchrony. In addition Electra is built on 
the top of group communication subsystems such as Isis and Horus.
3 Chameleon Infrastructure - Overview
Chameleon (see Figure 1) provides an adaptive infrastructure which allows different levels of 
availability requirements to be simultaneously supported in a single, heterogeneous clustered 
environment. Fundamental components which constitute the Chameleon include: (1) Fault 
Tolerance Manager (FTM) acting as an independent and intelligent entity capable of identifying
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and establishing the required fault tolerance strategy for executing the user application, (2) 
Reliable, Mobile and Intelligent Agents capable of migrating through the network and operating 
autonomously on behalf of the FTM according to built-in specifications and instructions, (3) 
Surrogate Manager operating as a pseudo-manager for one particular application and capable of 
interacting with the user and supporting proper communications with the agents which monitor 
the application execution on remote hosts, (4) Host Daemons residing on each host and 
responsible for handshaking with the agents and monitoring the agents’ behavior, and (5) 
Software Libraries providing basic building blocks to create or re-engineer agents. The idea is 
that a failure of none of these individual entities shpuld compromise the whole system.
In the initialization phase, the FTM collects information about the system configuration and 
characteristics of individual nodes. Initialization agents are sent to hosts to obtain this data and to 
install the host daemons on participating machines. After successful initialization, Chameleon is 
ready for accepting the user requests. When a request arrives, the FTM designates a query agent 
to acquire the necessary information on the application specifics such as the required availability 
level, needed system resources, types of results etc. Based on the collected information on the 
application, the FTM can identify the necessary fault tolerance strategy and can designate set of 
agents to initiate and monitor the application. Creation of agents is performed according to a 
predefined procedure which utilizes two software libraries: (1) library of building blocks and (2) 
library of agents. The FTM may create new agents from the basic building blocks or may re­
engineer already existing agents to extend their functions.
Agents designated to support the application execution migrate through the network to the 
selected nodes, install themselves on the machines and initiate the application execution. In 
addition, a Surrogate Manager is spawned by the FTM and associated with each application. The 
Surrogate Manager can be allocated on any machine in the network (including the node running 
the FTM). It maintains copy of the system information supported by the FTM, provides reliable 
communications with the user and supervises the agents which monitor the application execution 
on the remote hosts.
To ensure a rapid reaction to the application failures, the application is watched by the agent 
which installed the application at the remote host and started execution. The agent communicates
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to the appropriate Surrogate Manager detectable application misbehavior. As the agent itself may 
fail, it is watched by the host daemon which is capable of notifying the Surrogate Manager about 
agent failures. The Surrogate Manager can re-generate a new agent either to complete or to 
restart the application. Agents and Surrogate Managers once generated can act autonomously and 
the FTM is free to serve other user requests. As the Surrogate Managers are capable of 
performing the basic functions of the FTM, the application may complete even in presence of 
FTM failure. Errors and failures of the Surrogate Manager are directly reported to the FTM by 
the local Host Daemon monitoring the Surrogate Manager. The FTM, then re-initializes the 
application execution just as it would handle a new request. In order to detect node failures the 
FTM uses heartbeat messages which are sent with a predefined frequency. In the case of a node 
failure the application(s) executed on the node are migrated to other available nodes. To operate 
reliably, the FTM must be resilient to errors. The possible solution is to support a passive backup 
FTM which supports the system information and is updated each time the system state changes 
(typically when a new application is admitted to the environment or when an application exits 
from the environment).
The Chameleon implementation does not use a specialized language framework. Rather it is based 
on widely available scripting languages, such as TCL and high level programming languages such 
as C++. The aim is to provide a relatively thin software layer which must be present in each 
machine in the environment. The implementation of Chameleon is not based around CORBA, the 
Object Management Group's standard for building distributed systems with the design goals of 
heterogeneity, interoperability and extensibility. The motivations behind this design choice were 
multiple. To build Chameleon around CORBA would necessitate a full CORBA implementation 
around all the nodes in the system. The CORBA software would include an ORB with its name 
registry, support of IDL (Interface Definition Language) stubbers, etc. While increasingly vendors 
are providing applications conforming to CORBA specifications, still the vast majority of the 
existing applications were not built around CORBA objects. For instance, Piranha [4] requires a 
highly sophisticated CORBA ORB implementation capable of supporting object groups and 
failure detection. Hence in an environment like Chameleon which addresses availability needs in a 
general system of networked workstations (as opposed to specialized systems built with CORBA 
objects, for example), it was not considered desirable to impose the overhead of CORBA object
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handling. The cost of CORBA standardization is paid in the form of performance degradation 
because of intermediate layers of interfaces that an application must go through. This conflicts 
with our other design goal of high speed error detection and recovery. The important point 
however is that we do not preclude the use of CORBA in future versions (or alternate versions 
whose goal may be slightly different eg. to support CORBA applications only). We can port some 
of the CORBA layer along with the Host Daemons and the nodes would then be able to support 
CORBA applications. The ORB can be a centralized one residing on the dedicated FTM machine. 
The operative word is to support user-defined levels of availability without the burden of 
specialized software for prior installation at the user nodes. However we do not rule out CORBA 
extensions to the project in the future.
The key features of Chameleon can be stated as follows:
•  Chameleon is the first infrastructure which explicitly addresses the dynamic adaptation to the 
user required availability level in a heterogeneous, multi-node system
• Chameleon, by employing Reliable Agents and Surrogate Managers, maximizes the chances of 
the application to complete even if an entity of the infrastructure fails
• Chameleon does not require thick software layer to be maintained by each computation node
Figure 1: Reliable, Networked Computing Environment
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4 Components of the System
This section presents a detailed description of components of the Chameleon. Basic functions,
t
operational modes and component interactions are identified and characterized.
4.1 Fault Tolerance Manager (FTM)
The Fault Tolerance Manager is an intelligent, independent, active entity which operates in the 
networked environment with the task of providing continuous execution of the user request 
despite errors. The FTM is built as a reliable unit operating on a dedicated server. The decision 
mechanism at the FTM is responsible for identifying the configuration to execute the user 
application (e.g. single machine with recovery), determining machines to be used for the chosen 
configuration and finally setting up the environment for the particular mode of execution. The 
primary functions of the FTM can be summarized as follows:
• mapping the network, i.e., identification of the network configuration and collecting 
information about the nodes in the system. The data about the nodes are collected in the 
designated data structure which is updated when the nodes join or depart the network.
• invoking a daemon process on each node in the network for supporting node’s communication 
with FTM
• collecting application specifications from the user
• determining fault tolerance strategies for providing the application required availability level. 
The decision procedure is based on the application requirements and a data on prior history of 
failures and uses software libraries on error/failure detection and recovery techniques to 
compose final fault tolerance strategy.
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• generating a set of Agents and an associated Surrogate Manager for supporting the 
application execution according to earlier determined fault tolerance strategy
Figure 2: Data Structures for Maintaining System Information
In order to support these functions, the FTM utilizes and maintains information about the system. 
Three tables are used to support system specific information: (1) system configuration table 
which contains information regarding the various hosts which are participating in the environment 
and (2) runtime application table which contains information related to the various applications 
which are currently active in the environment, and (3) application specification table which 
contains information on the user application. The basic data structures used to keep the 
information are given in Figure 2.
Network mapping and host daemons initialization
The network mapping and the host daemons initialization is accomplished using initialization 
agents - init_agent(). Figure 3 presents the general structure of the initialization agent. It is 
assumed that functions in the agent body, e.g., get_sys_inf o () are already implemented and 
exist in one of the software libraries supported by the FTM (software libraries are presented in the 
further sections).
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init_agent (destination_host) {
config_info systemTable;
get_sys_info(systemTable); 
init_sys_daemon(); 
go_back_to_FTM(); 
put_info(systera_config_table);
}
get_sys_inf o (systemTable) {
systemO; // obtaining the system 
specific info
systemTable->machine_name = name; 
systemTable->net_address = addr; 
systemTable->architecture = arch; 
systemTable->0S = SUN 
systemTable-»memory = mem_size;
}
init_watchdog() {
if (monitor_notification) { 
watch_agent(agent_id); 
if (agent_terminated) { 
not i fy_FTM(agent, OK);
}
else if (agent_failure) { 
notify_FTM(agent, failure)
}
}
Figure 3: Basic Structure of the Initialization Agent
The initialization agent is responsible for setting up the system with the participating hosts. 
Whenever a host is plugged into the network, this agent is invoked and it executes steps necessary 
for the host to be recognizable by the FTM. The agent also sets up the Host Daemon 
(init_sys_daemon ()),  to handle communication with the FTM. A host on being plugged into 
the network needs to have an interface (e.g., a TCP configured port) capable of accepting the 
initialization agent from the FTM. The initialization agent queries for system parameters from the 
hosts (get_sys_inf o ()) such as the memory availability, the native operating system, and fills up
the information in the system configuration table at the FTM 
(put_info (system_conf ig_table) ). This data structure is later used by the FTM for issuing 
system specific commands at the remote host as well as determining the availability of required 
resources for running a particular application at the machine.
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Communication with the user
The input to the system are the user’s requirements gather by the specialized query agent - 
user_query_agent () (see Figure 4). The information is specified in a predefined format given by 
the app.spec data structure (see Figure 2). The meaning of fields available in the format is 
discussed below.
user_query_agent (usar_host) {
appl_info appllnfo;
appl_spec applSpec;
get_appl_info(appllnfo); 
get_user_spec(applSpec); 
go_back_to_FTM(); 
put_info(runtime_table); 
put_info(applSpec_table);
}
Figure 4: Basic Structure of the User Query Agent
Scope o f the specifications(spec Scope) - determines parts of the application which must be 
executed with different availability levels. This parameter can take two values: entire_appl and 
partial_appl. In the latter case, the user must provide explicit demarkation to identify individual 
segments of the application corresponding to the specified level(s) of reliability.
Required reliability level(reliability) - specified as an integer starting from 1 (for the lowest 
reliability level) up to n. The predefined fault tolerance strategies are described in Section 4.2.
Results o f interest (results)- specified as variables of interest at the end of the execution of the 
application or as the output file into which the results of the application are saved.
System resources required (resources) - specified as an amount of runtime memory required. 
Other applications required resources might include ghostscript, gnuplot for example.
Number o f machines (#machines) - determined as a number of machines on which copies of the 
application are to be executed.
Voting strategy (vote) - specified as n_of_m, i.e., n among m machines must agree for application 
to succeed (this also includes “no_voting” strategy).
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Agreement criterion (agree) - specified as an exact match or match in a range of values defined in 
terms of absolute value or percentage variation from mean.
Application time-out (timeOut) - an upper bound on the execution time of the application 
provided by the user. If the application does not terminate within this period, it is taken to have 
failed.
Identification of Fault Tolerance Strategy
The FTM determines the required fault tolerance strategy based on the data collected during 
communication with the user. In order to facilitate this decision, the FTM utilizes the three system 
tables (systemjconfig_table[], runtimeJable[], applSpec_table[]). The general procedure in 
selecting/identifying a required fault tolerance strategy is presented in Figure 5.
First, the FTM calls FT_strategy to identify whether the fixed level of availability is specified for 
the whole application. If so, the FTM calls FTjconfig to find which fault tolerance strategy to 
use. If the user specifies application regions with varying availability levels, the FTM calls 
instrument_appl() to identify the criticality levels, collects the data in a table and calls FT_config 
for determining appropriate fault tolerance strategies. The FTjconfig allows to distinguish among 
predefined strategies as well as the user might define his own approach(es). Functions 
single_machine_nr(), single jmachine_r(), dual_exec(), tmr_exec() are used (by FTjconfig) to set 
up default fault tolerance strategies, single machine execution without recovery, single machine 
execution with recovery, duplicated execution, triple modular redundancy, respectively. The latter 
option in the FTjconfig is for supporting user specified strategy which can be incorporated into 
an agent. Each of these functions support a procedure for creating the necessary set of agents and 
surrogate manager capable of supporting the application execution.
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Examples of agent creations and characterizations of different fault tolerance strategies are given 
in the next section.
FT_strategy(*applSpec_table) {
if (specScope == entire_appl) { 
FT_config();
}
else {
instruraent_appl (appl_name) ; 
FT_config();
}
}
FT_coafig (*applSpec_table, userid){
switch (reliability) { 
case(1) {
single_machine_nr();
}
case(2) {
single_machine_r();
}
case (3) {
dual_exec();
}
case (4) { 
tmr_exec();
}
default {
user_define();
}
user_define(*applSpec_table) { 
if (#machines == n) { 
if (voting == kOFn) { 
if (agree == EXACT) { 
voter(k, n, EXACT);
}
else if (agree == INEXACT) { 
voter(k, n, agreeRange);
}
else {
userVoteFunc();
}
else {
userVoteStrategy(ml, m2,..., mn) ;
}
}
else {
error(unidentified_strategy);
}
Figure 5: Procedure for Identifying the Fault Tolerance Strategy
4.2 Reliable Agents
The Agents are seen as a failure resilient carriers of information/stimulus to/from the Fault 
Tolerance Manager. They are designated by the FTM to perform the actions/operations needed 
for successful completion of the application in the designated mode. An agent is expected to be 
sufficiently intelligent to execute specified functions in an autonomous fashion. This is to prevent 
overload the FTM with too many tasks, which could reduce the FTM performance and thus 
decrease the utility of the environment. The primary characteristics of agents are: (1) mobility, (2) 
reliability, and (3) scalability (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6: Primary Characteristics of Agents
Mobility. Agents migrate through a computer network in order to accomplish actions specified 
by the FTM. Well-known communication protocols like TCP/IP may be used to support the 
mobility.
Reliability. Agents are resilient to the network or node failures. To achieve this, the agent code in 
the already existing libraries is tested rigorously against erroneous execution. It is also important 
to ensure that failure in the agent does not cause a crash of the application which it was in charge 
of executing or that the agent crash does not propagate out of the node. To meet this 
requirement, agents are watched by host daemons (the host daemon is notified which agent it will 
have to monitor for possible crash by the micro-operation monitorQ) and if an agent fails, the 
daemon notifies the Surrogate Manager or the FTM (in the case of the Surrogate Manager 
failure). The agent is protected from the network corruption by guarding it with check sum.
Scalability. Agents are easy to create or re-engineer using elementary blocks or already existing 
agents. The Chameleon provides a unified, general framework for creating new agents or 
extending functions of already existing agents. Consequently, the user can actively participate in 
developing agents, e.g., the user might provide an application specific detection mechanism to be 
incorporated into an agent. Two basic software libraries support this approach: (1) library of 
building primitives, and (2) library of agents.
• Library o f building blocks contains micro- and macro-operations for supporting application 
execution in the distributed environment. Agents can be created, modified, re-engineered
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using these bubbles. An example bubble is notify (target_machine, execution_mode, 
list_participating_machines). Section 3.4 provides more details on this library.
• Library o f agents contains hierarchically arranged already available agents which have the 
flexibility of extension: (1) basic agents, (2) agents extended from basic agents using primitive 
building blocks, (3) complex agents derived from the combination of existing agents, (4) user 
defined agents from existing or user-defined building blocks.
Primary functions of Agents are characterized below.
Configuring the system according to the selected fault tolerance strategy. Once the FTM 
decides to run an application in a particular mode, the set of agents and an associated surrogate 
manager are invoked to set up the environment to support the selected execution mode e.g., triple 
modular redundant execution. The agents and the surrogate manager take over from there. The 
agents have the tasks of porting the application code or executable to the three machines, 
executing them there, monitoring their status during execution (for example trap any 
segmentation violation signals, etc.) and finally returning the results to the surrogate manager. 
Predefined example configurations include:
Single machine with no recovery : in this most unreliable mode of execution, the user application 
is run on a single machine with no recovery information being maintained.
Single machine with recovery, in this mode the application is run on a single machine but 
provision is made for recovery if the application terminates abnormally. For example, 
checkpointing information is kept and in case of crash, if a homogeneous machine is available the 
code is re-executed from the checkpoint. If a homogeneous machine is not available, then the 
application is ported to another machine, recompiled and restarted.
Dual execution: the application is executed concurrently on two machines, (a primary and a 
secondary). An agent resides at each machine and monitors the application. In a simple 
operational mode, if the primary terminates normally, its result is taken and the secondary process 
and agent are killed. If the primary fails, the result from the secondary is accepted. In the case of 
double failure the application is taken as having failed. In another possible operational mode the
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results from the two executions are compared to produce final output from the application 
execution. In the case of any discrepancy between the two outputs, a failure is signaled.
Triple modular redundancy (TMR): This mode corresponds to the highest reliability 
requirements. The application is run on three machines and their results are voted on based on the 
simple majority principle. The voting is performed by the Surrogate Manager.
Monitoring the system. Chameleon supports three levels of system monitoring: (1) application 
monitoring, (2) agent monitoring and (3) node monitoring. The agents are responsible for 
monitoring the application execution and notifying the associated Surrogate Manager on a 
detected error. The software library available with the FTM provides series of detection 
mechanisms implemented as a macro-operations and used for building agents. Example detection 
mechanisms include:
Heartbeat: The FTM sends out heartbeats at regular intervals to ascertain whether a particular 
node is up or down. The heartbeat interval should be carefully chosen as too high a frequency can 
flood the system and too low a frequency can lead to imprecise monitoring. On receiving a 
heartbeat query from the FTM, the host responds to let it know its status. An alternative to this 
simple heartbeat scheme would be for the host to send out a signature message which is tallied at 
the FTM.
Application time out: The user can specify an upper bound on the time to completion of his 
application when he submits it. When the Surrogate Manager does not get notification of 
completion of the application from the agent in charge of monitoring it, it concludes that the 
application has failed.
System panic: The agent monitoring an application at a remote site can detect a system panic or a 
signal indicating a misbehaving application, trap the signal and notify the FTM or Surrogate 
Manager.
Voter: When an application is executed in the TMR mode, then a conflict in the voting results can 
point to an error in the application.
Restoring the application. In the case of an error in application execution or a node failure, 
Chameleon is capable of restoring the application on the same machine or other available
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machines. The software library with FTM provides set of recovery mechanisms implemented as 
macro-operations for restoring the application. Example recovery mechanisms include:
Process Migration: In the case of node failure the application must be migrated to another node. 
FTM or Surrogate Manager designate a new machine to run the application and restart (via an 
agent) the execution. The process migration between homogeneous nodes utilizes checkpointing 
and rollback and process migration between heterogeneous nodes is based on restarting the 
application after recompilation.
Checkpointing: Homogeneous checkpointing is supported in the system. This allows a rapid 
process recovery by not necessitating recompilation and re-execution from the beginning of the 
process. Heterogeneous checkpointing is considered as a valuable option, however, support of 
checkpoints on different platforms characterize large complexity, particularly when a checkpoint 
requires storing the entire system state which has different representations on different platforms.
4.3 Surrogate Manager
A Surrogate Manager is spawned by the FTM after the required fault tolerance configuration has 
been determined. It is created using procedure similar to the one employed for creating agents. 
Each Surrogate Manager is associated with an application (or for simple applications, several of 
them can also share the same Surrogate Manager). The Surrogate Manager can be seen as a 
“super agent” or “pseudo-manager”. It is capable of acting as a regular agent e.g., it can travel 
through the network to the designated nodes, it is recognized and monitored by the host daemon. 
At the same time, it is capable of operating as a manager i.e., it supervises agents which are 
designated to control the application, it can re-generate agents which failed during the operation. 
To facilitate autonomous and independent operation of the Surrogate Manager, a portion of the 
system information maintained by the FTM is also kept with the Surrogate Manager is located. By 
this means, the application can survive even in the case of FTM failure. The system information 
which must be available to the Surrogate Manager include: full specification of the application and 
access to the software libraries used to create or re-engineer the agents. It is worth noting that 
Surrogate Manager can be allocated on the same machine as the one on which the FTM is 
running. An example of the Surrogate Manager and its role in the application execution scenario 
is presented in section 5.
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4.4 Software Library
The Software Library contains basic building blocks/objects for implementing a variety of agents. 
Two basic classes of objects are distinguished: (1) micro-objects which represent elementary 
actions and (2) macro-objects which provide a full implementation of more complex mechanisms. 
An example of the first category is the notifyO function which provides a mechanism used by 
agents for notifying about various events that happen in the system. Macro-operations basically 
provide implementations of various detection and recovery techniques. The predefined 
mechanisms for error detection and recovery are implemented and collected in the library as 
macro-operations e.g., different voting algorithms. The library is an open entity and can be 
extended with new components. The user is allowed to actively participate in developing new 
strategies which can then be included to the library and used for creating agents (however the 
scope is restricted to that user’s applications only). An example is a customized acceptance test 
suited for checking the correctness of computation results.
4.5 Host Daemon
The host daemons are entities at each of the hosts that are responsible for handling 
communication with the FTM or the Surrogate Manager via the agents. The daemon processes 
accept the agents and interact with them to accomplish their task. The daemon processes have 
intelligence to recognize the type of agent being sent over and have a well-defined handshaking 
protocol for communicating with each of the agents. The daemon process is also capable of 
monitoring Agents and Surrogate Managers behavior. When the host daemon detects a 
malfunctioning of the agent it notifies the Surrogate Manager. An error encountered in the 
Surrogate Manager is communicated directly to the FTM. The FTM then sends over clones of the 
Agents and/or the Surrogate Manager to the particular host which complete the execution of the 
application in the desired mode.
5 Creation of Agents & Surrogate Managers- example scenarios
The FTM utilizes software libraries to compose Agents and Surrogate Manager for satisfying 
application requirements. The FTM gathers the user requirements (through the user query agent) 
and then checks in the agent library to see if an agent or surrogate manager with the required 
functions is available. If it is, the FTM invokes the appropriate component otherwise it creates the
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agent or the surrogate manager either from scratch or by specializing an already existing 
component. Examples of both methods are presented below. Example 1 presents a method of 
constructing agents and the surrogate monitor from scratch and Example 2 demonstrates creation 
of the surrogate monitor by specializing an already existing component.
Example 1.
Lets assume that the user wants to execute the application my_app.c in the centralized duplicated 
mode with the fail-safe failure semantic. By centralized we mean that the results from the two 
machines will be gathered and voted upon at the Surrogate Manager. Fail-safe failure semantic 
implies that if the results of the primary and the secondary are in conflict the application is taken 
to have failed. The user specifies that the results of the application are stored in a file called 
output. The FTM after taking the user specs decides on two machines, say x  and y, to run the 
application and generates the following two agents and a single Surrogate Manager from the 
building blocks. In this case all the basic building blocks are already existing in library.
Surrogate Manager#!
The Surrogate Manager can reside in any node in the network including the node which is running 
the FTM. This entity does the work of setting up two hosts to take part in the duplicated 
execution mode, notify the two host daemons to monitor the relevant agents, sends the 
application code to the two machines, then waits for the results to be brought back from the two 
hosts and finally compares the two results for passing back the final result of the application (or 
error status) to the user. The pseudo-code of the Surrogate Manager is shown in Figure 7.
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notify(me x,dup,me y); (1)notify(me y,dup,me x); (2)install(me x,agent#l); (3)install(me y ,agent#2); (4)monitor(me x,agent#l); (5)monitor(me y ,agent#2); (6)wait(agent#l,request_to_send_code) (7)wait(agent#2,request_to_send_code) (8)sand(my_app.c,me x,src); (9)sand(my_app.c,me y,src); (10)wait(response_from_agent#l); (11)wait(response_from_agent#2); (12)if (raad_failura(agent#l,errnol) II raad_failura(agent#2,errno2))
notify_FTM_failura(surrogateti,errnol||errno2) (13)alsa
{ // Both hosts executed application correctly
a = gat_rasult(agenttl); (14)b = gat_result(agent#2); (15)final_result = vota(a,b,2,2,EXACT); 
if (final_result == NULL) (16)
notify_FTM_failura{surrogate #1,NO_AGREEMENT); (17)alsa
notify_USER(surrogate #1,final result);
} (18)
Figure 7: A Surrogate Manager#! - pseudo-code
Lines (1) & (2) notify the hosts x  and y that they will be participating in duplicated execution 
with each other. (3) & (4) install the agents #1 and #2 in hosts x  andy. (5) & (6) instruct the host 
daemons at machines x  and y to monitor the agents #1 & #2. (7) & (8) wait for the agents #1 and 
#2 to request to send the application code from x  and y, respectively. (9) & (10) send the 
application code my_app.c to the two hosts. The src in the parameter tells the daemons that it is 
a source file that is being sent over that needs to be compiled and then executed. (11) & (12) wait 
for responses from agents #1 and #2 from x  and y, respectively, either about correct termination 
or an error flag detected during execution. If either of the agents flags an error, in (13) FTM is 
notified of the failed execution along with the error code. If both hosts ran the application 
succesfiilly, in (14) & (15) the result is collected from the two machines. In (16) the voter is 
invoked with the two results and specifying that a 2 out of 2 exact agreement is required for the 
voter to succeed. If the voter fails, NULL value is returned. In that case (17) i.e., the two 
executions returned different values, the FTM is notified of the failure. Otherwise, (18), the final 
result agreed upon by both machines is communicated to the user.
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Agent#1
The agent#l is sent over to the host daemon on machine jc where it will monitor the running of 
the application that will be sent over there by Surrogate Manager. This agent will detect faults if 
any during the running of the application and will notify the Surrogate Manager. If the application 
terminates normally, the agent sends the result back to Surrogate Manager. The pseudo-code of 
the agent# 1 is shown in Figure 8.
s«nd(surrogate#l/request_to_send_code,my_app.c) ; (1 )instali(my_app. c ) ; (2)
monitor(my_app.c); (3 )
if (detect_error (my_app. c, e r m o ) ! = 0 )
notify_fsilura(surrogateti, ermo); (4 )alsa
{ Il The application executed correctly
a = collact_rasult(output); (5 )
ratura_result(surrogateti, a); (6)
terminate(monitor,agent#l); (7 )
Figure 8: Agent#l - pseudo-code
Line (1) sends the request to the Surrogate Manager# 1 to send the source my_app.c. (2) installs 
myjapp.c i.e., compiles the source and starts execution. (3) starts the monitoring function of the 
agent. If an error is detected during execution of the application, the error number is returned in 
e r r n o  and Surrogate Manager#1 is notified about the failure. If the application terminated 
normally, then the result is collected from file output, (5), returned to the Surrogate Manager#1, 
(6), the watchdog process of the host daemon that was monitoring this agent is terminated, (7), 
and finally the agent itself is terminated, (8).
Agent#2
The agent#2 agent is sent over to machine y. This agent does exactly the same functions as 
agent# 1 but at machine y.
Example 2.
Let assume that the user specifies the application to be run on 3 machines and the voting strategy 
to be followed is simple majority. The agents and the Surrogate Manager for this mode are built 
by modifying already existing components.
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Surrogate Manager#2
The pseudo-code Surrogate Manager#2 is shown in Figure 9. A S u r r o g a te  M anager#2 is 
created by including new primitives to the S u r r o g a te  M anager# 1 (introduce changes are 
marked as a bold text)
noti£y(xnc x,trip,me y,mc z); (1)notify(mc y,trip,me x,mc z); (2)notify(mc z,trip,me x,mc y); (3)install(me x,agent#l); (4)install(me y,agent#2); (5)install(me z,agent#3); (6)monitor(mc x,agent#l); (7)monitor(me y,agent#2); (8)monitor(me z,agent#3); (9)wait(agent#l,request_to_send_code); (10)wait(agent#2,request_to_send_code); (11)wait(agent#3,request_to_send_code)j (12)send(my_app.c,me x ,sre); (13)send(my_app.c,me y ,src); (14)send(my_app.c,me z,sre); (15)wait(response_from_agent#l); (16)wait(response_from_agent#2); (17)
wait(response_£rom_agent#3); (18)
if((read_failure(agent#l,errnol) && read_£ailure(agent#2,errno2))
(read_failure(agent#2,errao2) && read_failure(agent#3,errno3))
(read_failure(agent#3,errno3) && read_£ailure(agent#1,erraol)))/* all this implying that at least two of the 3 have failed */notify_FTM_failure(surrogate#2, errnol | ermo2 || errno3); (19)else
{ // The application terminates 
a = get_result(agent#l);
normally
(20)b = get_result(agent#2); (21)c = get_result(agent#3); (22)final_result » vote(a,b,c,2,3,EXACT); (23)if (final_result == NULL)
notify_FTM_failure(surrogate#2,NO_AGREEMENT); (24)
else
notify_USER(surrogate#2,final result); (25)
}
Figure 9: A Surrogate M anager#2 - pseudo-code
Agents#l-3
The agents# 1-3 will execute the code in each of the three machines (in the current configuration, 
x, y  and z). The code for each of these agents is the same as that of the agent#1.
6 Prototype System Implementation
To demonstrate the capabilities of Chameleon, the prototype of the environment with the 
envisaged structure and a subset of the agent library has been implemented around four machines 
connected to the high-speed Myrinet LAN. The small network used consists of two Sun
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workstations running Solaris OS and two Intel PCs running Linux and connected via a Myrinet 
switch. One of the machines in the network has been dedicated for running FTM.
Figure 10 and Figure 11 illustrate a complete execution scenario of the user application in the 
Chameleon environment. Figure 10 gives the existing testbed configuration. Once the 
environment is activated, the system initialization agent is invoked by the FTM which creates the 
configuration table. The FTM also invokes the heartbeat agent with a default granularity of a 
fixed time interval and installs the host daemons on the 3 hosts in the network. This setup is 
shown in Figure 1 l(ii).
Figure ll(iii) shows the user communication with the FTM when he submits an application for 
execution. The application source is brought to the FTM which decides on the application 
execution mode. The Figure ll(iv ) shows the decisions taken by the FTM and the generation of 
the requisite agents for setting-up the desired execution mode. In the example, the FTM decides 
on a duplicated execution mode in the fail-safe (ie. both primary and secondary must agree for 
success) and centralized (ie. voting done at the FTM, contrary to agent at primary collecting the 
results and deciding) mode. Two agents (agent# 1-2) and the Surrogate Monitor are invoked. In 
this implementation, the Surrogate Manager is located on the same node as FTM (Sun 
Workstation - “dusek”). Since all the agents are already existing in the library, the FTM does not 
need to build up or reengineer any existing agent. The agents are installed at the appropriate 
machines (Intel PC - “intel2” and Sun Workstation - “mahler” on Figure 11 (iv)), the application 
code is taken over to the two machines participating in the duplicated execution mode and 
execution is started.
The agents monitor the application while the host daemons monitor the agents. This scenario is 
shown in Figure ll(v ). Figure 11 (vi) shows the case when the application terminates normally. 
The results are brought back to the Surrogate Monitor, where it is voted upon and the finally 
output is communicated to the user. Figure 1 l(vii) demonstrates the case when the program has 
an abnormal termination on one of the machines (intel2) and returns an error code. Since the 
decided mode was fail-safe the application is deemed to have failed and user is notified 
accordingly. The described scenario demonstrates already implemented features of Chameleon.
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Not all details are included (e.g., nodes communicate via TCP/IP protocol). The intention is to 
demonstrate the overall concept and to show the feasibility of the proposed approach.
(i) T estbed  configuration
Figure 10: The A pplication Execution in Chameleon Environm ent - The Environm ent
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7 Summary and Scope for Future Work
In the paper we have presented Chameleon, a flexible fabric for providing configurable fault- 
tolerance levels for user applications in a heterogeneous networked environment. Chameleon 
employs an unique master entity for coordinating application execution at the desired quality of 
service (QoS) called the Fault Tolerance Manager (FTM). The FTM identifies the configuration 
to execute the user application and designates reliable Agents and Surrogate Manager which 
migrate through the network with the task to set up the environment for the particular execution 
mode and to monitor the application execution. The environment is dynamic and adaptive to 
varying criticality requirements from one application to another as well as within the same 
application. It offers flexibility in employing detection and recovery techniques by allowing the 
provided software libraries of elementary building blocks and agents to be incrementally upgraded 
by both the Fault Tolerance Manager and the user.
As existing machine and network configurations need to support a broad range of applications 
with different reliability requirements, environments like Chameleon would be powerful in 
embedding such support in already existing systems. The environment has the added attraction of 
being able to support a wide spectrum of heterogeneous platforms and networks. We believe that 
the mobile agents provide a useful abstraction for migration of execution to remote platforms for 
supporting the user's needs. At the same time the environment code is “thin” enough to be 
integrated as a layer on top of existing operating systems.
The work on Chameleon is still in an initial phase. We have a prototype implementation with the 
FTM, a limited set of agents and host daemons. Further work needs to be done on the process of 
re-engineering of available agents to create new agents which will meet different user demands. 
Substantial future work will be directed towards setting up the general agent framework to make 
it more flexible to the application requirements. A graphical interface needs to be incorporated 
into the environment which will enable the user to monitor his application as well as interact with 
the FTM. The possibility of migrating the environment to different network protocols with 
varying reliability levels depending on the application needs opens up a broad scope of future 
work. Simultaneously with the actual implementation, work is also going on in simulating the 
environment using the process based simulation environment, DEPEND.
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